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Introduction
For almost 120 years the legal doctrine of  in loco parentis has been recognised by somejudges as providing a useful benchmark for the standard of  care owed by teachers to
pupils under their charge.1 In the recent case of  Murray v McCullough,2 the opening argument
of  counsel for the plaintiff/claimant ‘contended that the duty of  a schoolteacher is to take
such care of  his pupils as would a reasonably careful parent of  the children of  the family’.3 The High
Court judgment, delivered on 8 June 2016, cites with approval commentary on this issue
from Charlesworth and Percy on Negligence,4 the authorities highlighted drawn from a chapter
more generally focused on ‘Persons Professing Some Special Skill’.5 Significantly, Stephens J
makes plain the limitations of  referring to a ‘parent’ or ‘prudent father’ when defining the
scope of  the duty incumbent upon (specialist) teachers. This straightforward approach, by
concentrating on the ‘fundamental and simple proposition that the standard is to take
reasonable care in all the circumstances’,6 will be contended to be sensible, instructive and,
consistent with more recent decisions of  the higher courts. Nonetheless, in the specific
context of  sports negligence cases, identifying the crucial material factors ‘in all the
circumstances’ may prove challenging and problematic. Accordingly, this case note suggests
that in unpacking and scrutinising the totality of  circumstantial considerations, application
of  legal principles derived from ‘sports law’ jurisprudence provides courts in such cases
with valuable and necessary guidance.
Facts
Whilst representing her school in a first-eleven match on 6 December 2008, the plaintiff
suffered serious dental injuries, and a cut to her lip, when she was struck with a hockey
stick. Following medical evidence, the court accepted that had the plaintiff  been wearing
a mouth guard, the damage to her teeth would have been prevented. The plaintiff ’s case
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was that the wearing of  mouth guards ought to have been mandatory; that she was not
sufficiently warned of  the risks of  not wearing a mouth guard; and that her parents were
not sufficiently warned regarding the risks of  not wearing a mouth guard. The defendants
contended that they had discharged their obligation to take reasonable care in the
circumstances by recommending to the plaintiff  and her parents the use of  mouth guards
and by giving sufficient warnings. Common practice in other schools, guidelines
published by responsible bodies, including various National/International Governing
Bodies for Hockey (NGBs), and content from the ‘Safe Practice in Physical Education
and Sport’ publication were called in aid by the defendants to demonstrate that they had
fulfilled the appropriate standard of  care. 
Legal principles
In short, the determinative legal issue in this case concerned the law of  negligence’s
control mechanism of  breach, requiring the court to establish the standard of  reasonable
care (and skill) required in the specific circumstances. Consistent with the legal doctrine
of  in loco parentis, counsel on behalf  of  the plaintiff  submitted that the test adopted in
Williams v Eady, that of  the careful parent, should be regarded as informative.7 In
forcefully dismissing this submission, Stephens J insightfully observes:
. . . for my own part I would prefer that the standard of  the duty of  a
schoolteacher should not be expressed as taking such care of  his pupils as would
a reasonably careful parent of  the children of  the family but rather taking
reasonable care in all the circumstances. The yardstick is reasonable care; it is not
some notional standard as to what a reasonably careful and prudent parent of  the
family would or would not do in relation to his own children.8
The High Court regarded the circumstances ordinarily to be considered in such a case,
when fashioning the legal test to be applied, as typically including: the age and maturity of
the plaintiff;9 the tendency for children to sometimes fail to appreciate the magnitude of
risk and ignore/forget safety advice, it being necessary to balance such factors against the
fostering and growth of  personal autonomy and the cost of  preventative measures;10 and
the standard practice adopted in other schools and whether this might be viewed as
universal and logically justifiable.11 Arguably, a particular circumstance perhaps worthy of
more pronounced acknowledgment by the court, since it further contextualises and
distinguishes the respective duties of  parent(s) and physical education (PE)/sport
teacher(s), would have been explicit recognition that the case before it was an instance of
(alleged) professional negligence.12 Moreover, application of  legal principles derived from
‘sports law’ jurisprudence may have been of  considerable practical utility to the court when
unpacking the crucial material factors from the full circumstances of  this individual case.
Decision
The court accepted that the defendants had sent the plaintiff  a ‘School Uniform Code’
every year which recommended the wearing of  mouth guards by pupils for their own
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protection, as advised by the (International) Hockey Federation (FIH). Indeed, there
appeared a consensus on the guidance issued by NGBs, and the Safe Practice Publication,
there being no requirement for the mandatory wearing of  mouth guards in 2008.
Accordingly, in finding the approach of  the defendants to be consistent with the standard
procedure at schools in Northern Ireland, it fell for the court to decide ‘whether the
standard generally applied was sufficient to discharge the duty of  care in relation to the
plaintiff  who was 15 at the time of  the incident’.13 On this, Stephens J ruled in the
affirmative, the judgment ultimately concluding that sufficient warnings had been made to
bring the dangers of  not wearing a mouth guard to the attention of  both the plaintiff  and
her family. There were no grounds for a finding of  liability in negligence against the
defendants.
Comment
Sports negligence cases are highly fact-sensitive and context specific.14 Emphasis by the
court on the particular circumstances of  this individual case is to be expected. More
specifically, robust recognition of  the unsuitability and considerable limitations of  the
doctrine of in loco parentis in such a case is both welcome and necessary, not least, given the
emerging case law in this area.15
The teaching of  PE, and coaching of  sport, requires a specialist skill not ordinarily
possessed by the average reasonable parent.16 The test for negligence in such circumstances
‘is the standard of  the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that special
skill’.17 Simply applied, Murray v McCullough represents an instance of  professional liability.
Subsequently, careful consideration of  what might amount to regular practice, approved by
a responsible body and being capable of  withstanding logical scrutiny, underscores
application of  legal principles derived from professional negligence by the court.18 This is
a fundamental circumstance of  this particular case. Moreover, it makes problematic
reference to a ‘prudent parent’ when defining the standard of  care incumbent upon the
defendants. As succinctly articulated by Lord Justice Croom-Johnson when Van Oppen v
Clerk to the Bedford Charity Trustees19 was considered by the Court of  Appeal:
The background to the case is that the duty of  care which the school owes to its
pupils is not simply that of  the prudent parent. In some respects it goes beyond
mere parental duty because it may have special knowledge about some matters
which the parent does not or cannot have. The average parent cannot know of
unusual dangers which may arise in the playing of  certain sports, of  which rugby
football may be one. That is why the school undertakes to see that proper
coaching and refereeing must be enforced. It might know that some types of
equipment in, for example, gymnastics have their dangers. But this is all part of
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the duty placed on the school to take reasonable care of  the safety of  the person
and property of  each pupil.20
More recently, Lady Hale in the Supreme Court in Woodland v Swimming Teachers
Association21 reinforced the limitations of  attempts to apply the notion of  in loco parentis in
the educational context when stating, ‘it is not particularly helpful to plead that the school
is in loco parentis. The school clearly does owe its pupils at least the duty of  care which a
reasonable parent owes to her children. But it may owe them more than that.’22 
These dicta offer considerable support to the approach adopted by Stephens J in
Murray v McCullough. The teaching and coaching of  hockey requires the exercise of  a
special skill. This demands a higher standard of  care or, in adopting the words of  Lady
Hale, ‘more than’ what might be expected of  a reasonable parent. A reasonable parent
would not generally be required to possess the necessary level of  competence,
qualifications and/or experience to operate properly and safely in the same circumstances.
Accordingly, in endorsing the reasoning of  the High Court in Murray v McCullough, it is
submitted that reference to terminology embracing the concept of  the reasonably careful
parent, in instances of  professional negligence, is somewhat artificial, restrictive and,
ultimately, out-dated and best resisted.23
More generally, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts highlights the judiciary’s avoidance of
reducing ‘to rules of  law the question whether or not reasonable care has been taken’,24
with citation of  authority discouraged as a means of  clarifying reasonable care given the
uniqueness of  particular situations.25 Indeed, as noted by Judge LJ in the sports
negligence case of  Caldwell v Maguire, ‘the issue of  negligence cannot be resolved in a
vacuum. It is fact specific.’26 By mainly concentrating on the ‘Factual Background’ in
Murray v McCullough,27 the approach of  Stephens J appears to largely concur with these
observations. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that ‘[i]n law context is everything’,28
there being a body of  relevant and well-established ‘sports law’ jurisprudence intended to
prove instructive when sports negligence cases come before the courts.29
For instance, when sitting in the same High Court of  Justice in Northern Ireland in
2012, (the then) Gillen J, in Morrow v Dungannon and South Tyrone BC,30 framed
determination of  the standard of  care required by a fitness instructor as follows:
In arriving at the standard appropriate in any given case the court will take into
account the prevailing circumstances including the sporting object, the demands
made upon the participant, the inherent dangers of  the exercise, its rules,
conventions and customs, the standard skills and judgment reasonably to be
expected of  a participant and the standards, skills and judgment reasonably to be
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 67(2)254
20   Ibid 414–15 Croom-Johnson LJ. 
21   Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association [2013] UKSC 66.
22   Ibid [41].
23   See generally Partington (n 14).
24   M A Jones (ed), Clerk and Lindsell on Torts 21st edn (Sweet & Maxwell 2014) [8-143].
25   Ibid.
26   Caldwell v Maguire [2001] EWCA Civ 1054, [30].
27   Murray (n 2) [12]–[27].
28   R (Daly) v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532, [28] per Lord Steyn.
29   E.g. Caldwell (n 26); Smolden v Whitworth [1997] PIQR P133 (CA); Vowles v Evans [2003] EWCA Civ 318; Condon
v Basi (1985) 2 All ER 453 (CA).
30   Morrow v Dungannon and South Tyrone BC [2012] NIQB 50.
expected of  someone such as the defendant and Mr Taffee in instructing
monitoring and supervising the plaintiff.31
Whilst it is clear that the above propositions, originally fashioned in Caldwell v Maguire,32
require appropriate amendment to reflect often quite different sporting circumstances,33
they undoubtedly afford guidance to courts in sports negligence cases by focusing on
crucial material factors derived from the totality of  circumstances. Simply applied, they
allow for a more nuanced and precise legal test by more effectively contextualising sports
negligence cases. As such, by explicitly accounting for the interaction between the law of
negligence and sport, particular propositions directly in point in Murray v McCullough
would appear to include: the inherent dangers of  hockey; the rules, conventions and
customs involved in playing hockey at first-eleven school standard for under-16s in 2008;
the standard skills and judgment reasonably to be expected of  the plaintiff  with regard to
wearing a mouth guard and appreciating the risks of  not doing so; and the standards,
skills and judgment reasonably to be expected of  the defendants in instructing,
monitoring, supervising and warning the plaintiff  of  the general risks involved in playing
hockey and the specific dangers generated by not wearing a mouth guard. In future
possible sports negligence cases, these propositions will likely prove instructive to courts
when crystallising the standard of  care incumbent upon PE teachers, fitness instructors
and/or sports coaches. By continuing to explicitly recognise and account for the
application of  ordinary tort law principles in the special circumstances of  sport, this
would no doubt further contribute to the emerging and distinctive body of  ‘sports law’
jurisprudence.
Case notes
31   Ibid [20].
32   Caldwell (n 26) [11]. 
33   Significantly, Caldwell relates to the duty of  care owed by professional jockeys to fellow athletes in elite
competitive sport. Therefore, although the legal duty of  reasonable care is applicable, as noted by Lord
Bingham in Smoldon v Whitworth when distinguishing between the duties of  a referee in relation to the players
and that of  a participant in a contest in relation to a spectator: ‘the practical content of  the duty differs
according to the quite different circumstances’ (Smoldon (n 29) 139).
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